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Economic effects of SOX Section 404 compliance: A 
corporate insider perspective 
 
ABSTRACT - We use survey responses from 2,901 corporate insiders to assess the costs and benefits of 
compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The majority of respondents recognize 
compliance benefits, but they do not perceive these benefits to outweigh the costs, on average. This is 
particularly true among smaller companies where the start-up costs are proportionately larger. However, 
the perceived efficiency of compliance increases with auditor attestations, years of compliance 
experience, and after the remediation of a material weakness. Notably, the perceived effects of 
compliance depend largely on firm complexity, but are mostly unrelated to firm governance structure. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Internal controls, Regulation, Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 404. 
JEL Classification: G18, G38, K22, M49. 
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1. Introduction  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002. Section 404 of SOX requires 
management to assess the effectiveness of its internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) – 
404(a) – and to have an independent auditor attest to and report on management’s assessment – 
404(b). These requirements met with widespread approval from individual and institutional 
investors. In contrast, the business community viewed the new rules as overly burdensome, 
arguing that they imposed compliance costs without commensurate benefits (e.g., Hochberg, 
Sapienza, Vissing-Jørgensen, 2009, HSV henceforth). This concern was particularly acute for 
smaller companies where fixed costs of compliance weigh more heavily (e.g., Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, 2003; Romano, 2005). In 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
introduced guidance for Section 404(a) requirements and the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) implemented Auditing Standard No. 5 for 404(b) requirements.  
In this paper, we analyze a comprehensive survey of corporate insiders on the economic 
consequences of Section 404 compliance. The SEC administered the survey between December 
of 2008 and January of 2009. Managers from 2,901 unique U.S. public companies participated in 
the survey, including respondents from more than half of all companies filing a report pursuant 
to Section 404(b) at that time.1 Participants responded to detailed questions about the impact of 
compliance on various aspects of their firms’ information environments, compliance costs, and 
perceived benefits net of costs. We analyze these survey data to address several open questions 
in the literature: Do insiders perceive that Section 404 compliance has benefits? Do the benefits 
outweigh the costs? Do the effects of compliance vary systematically across respondent firms? 
Are there start-up and fixed costs to Section 404 compliance? Are there incremental benefits 
from Section 404(b) compliance?  
                                                            
1 The survey data are available from the SEC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or directly from 
Gennaro Bernile upon request at gbernile@smu.edu.sg. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319414 
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The survey responses reflect a range of experiences with Section 404. Nearly two-thirds of 
the respondent firms were publicly traded when SOX was enacted, but more than a quarter had 
not yet complied with Section 404(b) requirements at the time of the survey. While the questions 
focused predominantly on the most recently completed fiscal year, the survey also asked 
respondents to report costs and perceived net benefits of compliance for the prior year and the 
year in-progress at the time of the survey. We exploit the within and across firm variation in 
responses to assess the impact of compliance experience and of the 2007 regulatory reforms.  
Overall, the evidence is consistent with a causal link between Section 404 compliance and 
improvements in the quality of the firms’ information environment. Specifically, 80% of 
respondents ascribe some benefits to Section 404 compliance. Large fractions of respondents cite 
a positive impact of compliance on the quality of their firm’s internal control structure (73%), 
their audit committee’s confidence in the ICFR (71%), the quality of their firm’s financial 
reporting (48%), and their firm’s ability to prevent and detect fraud (47%).  
However, the mean reported total cost of Section 404 compliance for the most recently 
completed fiscal year is $1.21 million, consistent with smaller scale industry surveys.2 We also 
find that compliance costs normalized by the firm asset base decrease with firm size, consistent 
with fixed costs of compliance. Nevertheless, the reported total cost declines significantly over 
subsequent years of compliance across all firm size groups and does so at a faster rate among 
smaller companies. This novel finding shows that the fixed costs of compliance are partly non-
recurring (i.e., start-up) and thus suggests that inferences based on firms’ early compliance 
experiences might overestimate the steady-state costs of compliance. 
Despite an overwhelming recognition of at least some benefits, only 19% of respondents 
perceive a net benefit from Section 404 compliance in the most recently completed fiscal year. 
                                                            
2 See, e.g., Financial Executive International, “FEI Audit Fee Survey Including Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs,” 
April 2, 2008; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Cost of SOX 404 Survey,” October 31, 2007.
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Yet, consistent with the declining trends in compliance costs, the average respondent ascribes an 
increasingly higher net benefit to Section 404 compliance for more recent years. Our tests show 
that the number of years of 404(b) compliance, the introduction of the SEC’s management 
guidance, and the PCAOB’s issuance of Auditing Standard No. 5 are associated with a higher 
perceived net benefit, suggesting that learning and lower regulatory uncertainty contribute to 
enhancing the perceived efficiency of Section 404 compliance. 
To assess the determinants of the reported effects of Section 404 compliance, we link the 
survey responses with other standard financial and accounting databases. We find that perceived 
benefits increase with firm size and geographical dispersion of operations, but are lower for 
firms reporting multiple business segments or R&D expenditures. Moreover, direct experience 
and learning are important determinants of the (perceived) effects of compliance. Both longer 
compliance experience and the remediation of internal control deficiencies (ICD) identified 
through the compliance process are associated with greater perceived benefits. In contrast, there 
is little evidence that other features of firms’ governance structures measured at the time of the 
survey influence the respondents’ views on the effects of Section 404 compliance.  
We further examine this issue by analyzing the relation between the survey responses and 
firms’ lobbying behavior following the Act’s passage. We find that the respondents from firms 
that lobbied against SOX – firms that HSV characterize as having more severe agency problems 
and, thus, expected to benefit most from its provisions – are more likely to recognize [net] 
compliance benefits than those from non-lobbying firms. This evidence supports HSV’s 
conclusion that (the type of) firms that opposed strict implementation of the rules were also those 
most likely to benefit of compliance.  
In additional tests, we examine how survey responses vary with the investors’ reactions to 
the adoption of Section 404 rules, as well as post-SOX changes in various empirical proxies for 
the quality of firms’ information environments. Respondent firm abnormal returns around events 
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that lead to the passage of SOX as identified by Zhang (2007) increase with the reported 
compliance benefits and benefits net of costs. This evidence suggests that investor pre-
implementation expectations and insider post-implementation assessments are correlated with 
beliefs about the effects of compliance. Conversely, respondent firm abnormal returns around 
Section 404 implementation events are negatively correlated with the reported benefits of 
compliance, consistent with already-compliant firms benefiting least from the implementation. 
Finally, we find that the perceived benefits of compliance increase when the information 
environment of the firm improves following SOX, as captured by lower equity betas and higher 
stock liquidity (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009). Overall, the cross-sectional variation in the 
survey responses is consistent with that observed both in investor pre-implementation 
expectations and in real post-implementation effects. 
Our survey-based research design addresses certain limitations of traditional archival studies 
on the effects of regulation, in general, and disclosure rules, in particular. First, because 
regulatory changes typically affect all similar firms at the same time, there is no clear 
counterfactual with which to compare compliance effects and establish causality (Joskow and 
Rose, 1989). Second, measurement of the quality of a firm’s information environment and, thus, 
of the related effects of disclosure rules is often imprecise and subject to alternative 
interpretations. Hence, even when a clever experimental design mitigates the first challenge, 
observing and interpreting a significant correlation might prove elusive. The survey approach 
mitigates both concerns, because questions are designed to explicitly identify the perceived 
causal impact of compliance on specific features of a firm’s information environment.  
Nonetheless, there are shortcomings to the survey approach, some of which are peculiar to 
our setting. In general, survey questions may leave room for inconsistent interpretations and 
allow personal biases to affect the responses when subjective assessments of the participants are 
required. In addition, we confront some unique challenges due to the specific nature of the SEC 
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survey. First, the design of the questions and their placement in the survey reflect broader 
objectives than the goal of this paper. As discussed in detail below, these considerations affect 
the structure of the survey in ways that severely restrict and potentially bias our sample of 
respondents for some parts of the analysis. As such, the generalizability of some of our 
conclusions may be limited. Second, respondents may have been reluctant to provide sensitive 
information because a securities regulator administered the survey. Or, to the extent that they 
believed the survey would affect regulations, participants may have provided responses that 
reflect their policy objectives rather than their actual compliance experiences.  
With these limitations in mind, our analysis provides evidence on the perceived impact of 
Section 404 compliance and offers several novel insights that augment the existing literature on 
SOX. First, corporate insiders overwhelmingly perceive improvements in their firms’ 
information environments, but generally do not recognize capital market benefits. Second, while 
we find evidence consistent with the concerns about the “one-size-fits-all” nature of the 
requirements (e.g., Iliev, 2010; Leuz, 2007; Ribstein, 2005), we also show for the first time that 
part of the fixed expenses of compliance are start-up costs. In fact, by the third year of 
compliance, the relative cost burden on smaller companies is comparable to that resulting from 
other regulatory requirements. Third, we show that compliance effects vary systematically across 
firms and respondents. Most notably, the perceived benefits of compliance increase with auditor 
attestation, compliance experience, the remediation of ICDs, and the regulatory reforms of 2007.  
Our study is unique in several ways when compared to industry surveys on SOX or other 
survey studies in the academic literature. First, the response rate (35%) and the number of 
respondent companies (2,901) are very high compared to prior surveys.3 Second, we are able to 
link the firm-level survey responses to traditional finance and accounting databases. Third, 
                                                            
3 The response rates to the SOX surveys conducted by FEI (2008) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2007) are 
5.2% and 3.6% respectively. The response rates to prominent academic surveys are 16% in Brav et al., (2005); 9% 
in Graham and Harvey (2001); 10.4% in Graham et al., (2005); and 12% in Trahan and Gitman (1995). 
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during the survey design phase, a stratified sample of 500 companies was randomly selected for 
targeted outreach to solicit participation. This treatment is associated with a 23% increase in the 
likelihood of participation, providing a well-suited instrument to control for potential self-
selection (non-response) bias. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey on the 
effects of SOX that also analyzes insiders’ perceptions of compliance benefits, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the costs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we describe the 
survey method and sample, and provide an overview of the related literature. We discuss the 
survey univariate statistics in Section 4, and how survey responses vary with firm and respondent 
characteristics in Section 5. We summarize our analysis of how the survey responses relate to 
managers’ and investors’ ex ante perceptions in Section 6, and to observed post-SOX changes in 
the quality of firms’ information environments in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Survey method and data 
2.1. Survey design  
The survey comprises more than 100 questions pertaining to companies’ experiences with 
Section 404 compliance. We focus on the subset of questions on the perceived benefits, realized 
costs, and perceived net benefit of compliance.  The questions about the perceived benefits have 
no time dimension, whereas the questions on costs and the net benefit of compliance refer to 
each of three separate fiscal years: the most recently completed fiscal year at the time of the 
survey, the fiscal year just prior, and the fiscal year in progress at the time of the survey. Given 
the timing of the survey, the most recently completed fiscal year for the respondent firms is 
either 2007 or 2008.4 
                                                            
4 For a complete list of the survey questions and an expanded discussion of their design and administration, see 
Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal Control over Financial Reporting Requirements, at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf.  
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Prior to the official survey launch, a third-party contractor with survey experience conducted 
three rounds of testing on a beta group of corporate executives. These tests revealed that the 
initial survey was too long. For this and other reasons, several questions were moved to three 
optional sections placed at the end of the main survey. Many participants did not continue to the 
optional sections, resulting in a lower response rate for those questions. This is important for our 
purposes because the net benefit of compliance questions, which are central to our analysis, were 
among those placed in the optional sections.  
In hindsight, we view this placement decision as a flaw in the survey design. The decision 
reflects a tradeoff between competing learning objectives among the drafters of the survey, some 
of whom focused on process-related aspects of how companies complied with Section 404 
requirements as opposed to the perceived economic consequences of compliance. 5  The 
placement of the net benefit questions in the optional section of the survey also reflects concerns 
that responses would be too subjective because those questions did not center on any specific 
compliance cost or effect, potentially introducing a response bias that would complicate 
interpretation. Our multiple regression tests address this concern as well as the additional self-
selection bias introduced by the optionality of the questions.  
The survey targeted all companies that reported to the SEC by filing on a form 10-K, 10-
KSB, 20-F, or 40-F in calendar years 2006 and 2007, and had stock-price data in Datastream as 
of October 2008. This two-part screening identified 8,206 firms. Each firm received survey 
invitations addressed to the CEO, CFO, and the General Counsel. Invitations asked the recipient 
to participate in a web-based survey or to pass the survey hyperlink and necessary credentials to 
an individual they thought best informed about the firm’s compliance experience. 
                                                            
5 For instance, the survey asked a long series of questions on the determinants of auditors’ allocation of time spent 
on a companies’ ICFR and on various ways companies used outside consultants and vendors in their compliance 
process. Sections F and I of the main survey contain 48 questions, across three fiscal reporting years, covering these 
areas.  
 8 
 
A random sample of 500 companies stratified by size was targeted with follow-up outreach 
efforts to elicit participation. The response rate for these companies was 23% higher than those 
not receiving the follow-up treatment. This random identification explains the response rate but 
is unrelated to the survey responses, providing a valid instrument to control for potential non-
random selection in the decision to participate in the survey.  
The survey responses were recorded over the two-month period from December 2008 to 
January 2009 and merged with firm-level variables obtained from common financial and 
accounting databases – CRSP, Compustat, Thomson Financial, Datastream, and Audit 
Analytics.6 After the merge, in order to facilitate the use of the survey responses by researchers 
outside the Commission, firm identifiers were dropped and the merged financial data obfuscated 
– using decile or centile rankings – to preserve the anonymity of the respondent firms.7 
2.2. Survey response statistics 
At least one individual from 2,901 unique companies responded. This corresponds to a 35% 
response rate among targeted companies, and a 50% response rate among the subset required to 
comply with Section 404(b).8 In 216 instances there were multiple respondents from the same 
firm, leading to 3,138 total responses. We retain only the highest ranked respondent, defined 
according to the order of titles listed in Panel B of Table 1.9 The most frequently reported title is 
CFO (922), followed by Controller (291), Chief Accounting Officer (216), and CEO (205). 
Notably, 1,001 respondents selected “other” and provided title descriptions frequently referring 
                                                            
6 We refer the reader to Appendix A for details on variables’ definitions and data sources. 
7 Although our tests in this paper use the publicly available response data that is obfuscated using decile and centile 
rankings for the linked financial data, we obtain very similar results when using the raw data.    
8 We dropped six respondents to the survey that did not meet the original identification criteria for inclusion, but 
were allowed to participate after learning of the survey through indirect channels. This accounts for the difference in 
number of participants reported in the SEC’s 2009 study referenced in footnote 3. 
9 Our results do not materially change if we use: (1) all responses, (2) the firm-level average response for the 
multiple responses, (3) the highest or lowest response only when multiple responses occur, or (4) only single 
response companies. 
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to “SOX compliance.” Hence, in many instances, survey participation was delegated to 
individuals most directly involved with the compliance process. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number targeted companies and response rates for Fama and 
French’s (1997) 49 industries. Banking is the most represented: 50% of 810 companies 
responded. The lowest response rates are from Entertainment (19%), Recreation (17%), and 
Steel Works (16%) industries, while Fabricated Products (62%), Tobacco Products (57%), and 
Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment (57%) have the highest response rates. 
3. Related literature  
Archival studies that analyze the effects of SOX rules yield mixed conclusions. Doyle et al. 
(2007a) find that material weaknesses in internal controls reported in Section 404 compliance 
disclosures are associated with a lower quality of reported earnings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2009) conclude that firms that disclosed ICDs face higher costs of equity. Both findings are 
consistent with Holmstrom and Kaplan’s (2003) assertion that the provisions of SOX “deal both 
directly and indirectly with some of the deficiencies of U.S. corporate governance.”  
Other research questions whether the overall benefits outweigh the compliance costs. Zhang 
(2007) documents large negative market returns around the passage of SOX. Iliev (2010) finds 
that, on net, SOX compliance reduces the market value of small companies. Kinney and 
Shepardson (2009) report similar findings. They infer from the experience of first-time Section 
404(b) compliers that annual audits of the ICFR might not be value enhancing for smaller U.S. 
public companies and that management reports with traditional financial audit oversight might be 
a cost-effective alternative. 
Another line of research shows that the net benefit from SOX compliance varies across 
firms. For instance, Ge and McVay (2005) show that the likelihood of ICDs increases with 
business complexity, which implies the benefits from Section 404 compliance might increase 
with firm complexity. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) find that the net benefits of SOX 
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are higher for non-compliant firms that operate in low information cost environments (i.e., with 
high analyst following). Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Li et al. (2008) show that firms 
relatively less compliant with the new rules at the time of their announcement or at greater risk 
of earnings management, respectively, experienced higher risk-adjusted stock returns around the 
passage of SOX. Similarly, HSV find that the propensity to lobby against SOX was highest 
among firms characterized by more severe agency problems. In contrast, Jain and Raezee (2006) 
find that SOX is more beneficial for companies with stronger governance.  
We use the SEC survey to examine whether firm characteristics that reflect information 
asymmetries and weaknesses in financial reporting and control systems can explain insiders’ 
views on the economic effects of Section 404 compliance. Moreover, we test whether learning 
and lower regulatory uncertainty reduce the cost and enhance the net benefit of compliance.  
4. Respondents’ perceptions of Section 404 compliance  
Survey participants answered a series of questions on the benefits, costs, and net benefit 
from Section 404 compliance. The costs are measured in hours of staff time and dollars of out-
of-pocket expenses, while the perceived benefits and net benefit are measured on ordinal scales. 
4.1. Benefits 
The respondents answered twelve questions about the effects of compliance on the quality 
of the firm’s information environment. For each question, they could answer that compliance has 
“positive impact,” “little or no impact,” or “negative impact,” coded as +1, 0, and -1 
respectively. Because higher values reflect more positive effects, we refer to these responses as 
perceived benefits. Panel A of Table 2 reports the corresponding survey response statistics.  
On average, respondents report a positive impact of compliance on internal governance: 
quality of the company’s internal control structure (73% positive); audit committee’s confidence 
in the company’s internal control over financial reporting (71%); quality of company’s financial 
reporting (48%); and company’s ability to prevent and detect fraud (47%). Thus, large fractions 
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of corporate insiders participating in the survey perceive that Section 404 compliance enhances 
the effectiveness of internal governance. 
In contrast, survey respondents do not perceive that Section 404 compliance results in 
capital market-related benefits. Only 4% of the respondents recognize a positive effect of 
compliance on the liquidity of the company’s common stock and only 9% on the company’s 
ability to raise capital, with near-zero mean responses in both cases. These results might be 
partly due to the fact that the survey was administered during the 2008/2009 financial crisis, 
which by most accounts severely reduced liquidity and access to capital and thus may have 
biased the respondents’ perceptions. 
When asked about the effect of Section 404 compliance on investor confidence in their 
company, 24% of respondents indicate a positive impact. This is significantly lower than the 
proportion of respondents (71%) who perceive a positive impact on the audit committee’s 
confidence in the company’s internal controls, which suggests that corporate insiders might 
benefit more than investors from Section 404 compliance. However, when asked about their own 
confidence in the financial reports of other 404-compliant companies, 39% of respondents report 
a positive impact. Hence, insiders are significantly more likely to report a positive impact from 
Section 404 compliance on the perceived reliability of other companies than their own. One 
explanation consistent with the seemingly discordant responses to these three questions is that 
insiders do not fully internalize the benefits from their own firm’s compliance to outsiders.  
The respondents express mixed views regarding the effects of Section 404 compliance on 
the efficiency of the firm’s operating and reporting processes. Some respondents report a positive 
impact of compliance on the efficiency of their company’s operation (29%), timeliness of their 
company’s financial statement audit (21%), and the efficiency of their company’s financial 
reporting process (13%). However, a similar proportion of respondents report negative effects. 
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Likewise, while 15% of the respondents indicate a positive impact of compliance on overall firm 
value, nearly as many respondents (12%, untabulated) perceive a negative effect.  
These results may not be surprising given that Section 404 requirements introduce new 
layers of reporting and auditing procedures. Nevertheless, with respect to the claims that these 
requirements introduce widespread inefficiencies, the evidence suggests a far less critical view. 
When we average the responses to all 12 benefit questions, 67% of the respondents report an 
overall positive impact and only 17% of respondents (untabulated) fail to recognize at least one 
benefit.  
4.2. Costs  
The respondents answered questions on four types of compliance costs: (1) the proportion of 
annual audit fees allocated to the independent audit of ICFR; (2) the annual (non-audit) fees paid 
to outside vendors to help comply with Section 404; (3) the internal staff hours spent on 404 
compliance; and (4) any remaining non-labor expenses such as software, hardware, and travel. 
The survey asked participants to provide separate estimates for the most recently completed 
filing year (2008 for 73% of respondents and 2007 otherwise), the previous filing year, and the 
filing year in progress at the time of the survey, identified in Table 2 as most recent, prior, and 
in-progress (expected) reporting year, respectively. Some respondents were unable to provide 
estimates for all cost categories, which restricts our sample for this portion of the analysis.10 
As shown in Panel B, the mean (median) total cost of compliance is $1.21 ($0.45) million in 
the most recent reporting year, which includes 357 firms that had yet to comply with Section 
404(b) requirements at the time of the survey. The mean reported total cost is 16% lower than in 
                                                            
10 To estimate the total cost of compliance, we require non-missing values for all four categories. Assessing Section 
404(b) audit fees provided the greatest challenge because Section 404(b) fees are not billed separately from the 
financial statement audit, requiring firms to estimate the cost allocation. We set the costs for outside vendor and 
non-labor to zero when the respondent answered “Not applicable.” Alternative (unreported) treatments of missing 
values with imputed values result in larger average total cost estimates, but do not materially affect the results of 
subsequent regression tests. 
 13 
 
the prior reporting year, and expected to decline an additional 13% in the reporting year in-
progress. For 404(b)-compliant firms, Section 404 audit fees are the largest cost component 
($676,000) and account for 35% of total audit fees, on average (untabulated). 11 This is similar to 
the first-time audit fee premiums reported by Dey and Sullivan (2009) and Kinney and 
Shepardson (2009), 32% and 54%, respectively. The internal labor costs – based on a $50 hourly 
wage – are the second largest component ($434,000), followed by outside consultants 
($208,000), and other miscellaneous expenses ($83,000).  
4.3. Net benefit  
The respondents provided an assessment of the benefits from Section 404 compliance net of 
costs for the same three compliance years for which they reported compliance costs. Because – 
as explained earlier – these questions were placed in an optional section of the survey, only 1,066 
participants responded.12 Among these, only 19% perceive a positive net benefit in the most 
recent year (Panel C, Table 2). In contrast, 64% (untabulated) of these same respondents 
perceive at least some positive effect as measured by the average response to the 12 benefits 
questions. Moreover, consistent with the declining trend in compliance costs, the fraction of 
respondents assessing a positive net benefit for t=0 is nearly double that for the prior reporting 
year, t=-1, and significantly lower than that for the reporting year in-progress (26%), t=1. 
Panel D of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the reported costs, 
benefits, and net benefit of compliance. Interestingly, there is a positive correlation (0.13) 
between net benefit and total cost, which implies that the marginal (perceived) benefit increases 
with the compliance burden. There is also a large positive correlation (0.63) between perceived 
                                                            
11 The 2008 FEI survey reports costs of $850,000 for 404 audit fees, $550,000 for internal staff, and $260,000 for 
outside vendors.  
12 Of the 1,066 respondents that chose to participate in the optional section of the survey, only 570 did so at the 
originally sitting. The remaining 496 responded after being contacted by the third party contractor as part of a post-
survey outreach aimed at increasing the participation rate of the optional sections. We recognize that the analysis of 
these data poses additional concerns regarding potential self-selection (i.e., the decision to continue the survey). 
Indeed, as discussed later, respondents reporting lower benefits in the main survey were more likely to continue with 
the optional section at the originally sitting. 
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benefits and net benefit, which suggests that the cross sectional variation in net benefit of 
compliance largely reflects variation in perceived benefits.  
5. Determinants of the perceived effects of Section 404 compliance  
In this section, we examine the relation between the perceived effects of compliance and 
three sets of firm characteristics that prior research suggests might affect the costs and benefits 
from SOX provisions: (1) operational and business complexity, (2) governance structure, and (3) 
presence of material weaknesses in financial reporting. In addition, we examine whether years of 
compliance experience, the respondent’s tenure and position, and the 2007 reforms explain the 
variation in perceived effects of compliance. Our regression models take the following form: 
(1) 
 
where Effecti is the perceived benefits, costs, or net benefit of compliance – for firm i; 
Complexity, Governance, and MatWeakness are vectors of firm characteristics that reflect the 
complexity, governance strength, and material weaknesses in financial reporting of firm i; and 
Controls includes all other firm and respondent characteristics discussed below. 
An ideal analysis would examine the benefits, costs, and net benefit of compliance for the 
same group of respondents. However, as previously noted, the net benefit questions were placed 
in an optional section of the survey and only 37% of participants elected to complete this section. 
Moreover, only 60% of respondents provide an estimate of the 404(b) portion of total audit costs. 
Because of these data limitations, we have three separate samples. The full set includes 2,901 
respondents that answered at least one of the compliance benefits questions. Among these, 1,760 
provide complete data on compliance costs and 1,066 provide an assessment of the net benefit of 
compliance for the most recently completed fiscal year. Data limitations from other sources 
further restrict these samples in our regression tests.  
Effect i  ao  a1 j
j
 Complexity ij  a1k
k
 Governance ik  a1m
m
 MatWeakness im  a1n
n
 controls in  ei
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The explanatory variables in the model use the most recent data available prior to the survey 
launch unless otherwise noted (see Appendix A for details). To prevent reverse engineering of 
the respondent firms’ identities, all raw variables are converted to ordinal ranks of various 
precisions (i.e., deciles or centiles) or expressed as indicator variables.13  
5.1. Explanatory variables  
5.1.1. Firm Complexity  
Prior research suggests that firm complexity is a likely determinant of Section 404 
effectiveness. We use four measures to test this conjecture. The first is the firm’s market value of 
equity (MVE). The second is geographic dispersion (GeoDispersion), defined as the average 
distance between the firm’s regions of operations listed in its 10-K and its headquarters. These 
two variables aim to capture the increased difficulty in managing and monitoring larger and more 
dispersed firms (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Giroud, 2010), and relatedly capture increased scope 
for managerial discretion and empire building. The next two measures capture the difficulty 
investors might face in understanding the firm’s operations. The first, R&D, is defined as 
research and development expenditures scaled by total assets and equal to zero when no such 
expenditure is reported. The second, MultiSegment, is an indicator variable equal to one when 
the firm reports multiple business lines, and zero otherwise (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2009; Zhang, 2007). MVE and R&D are converted to decile rankings, and 
GeoDispersion to centile rankings. 
5.1.2. Firm Governance 
The predicted effect of firm governance strength on the perceived impact of Section 404 
compliance is unclear. HSV show that strong governance and the absence of agency conflicts 
pre-SOX are associated with fewer expected benefits of compliance. However, poorly governed 
                                                            
13 The choice between decile and centile ranks depends on the sparseness of centile groupings. Deciles are used 
anytime centile ranks produce thinly populated groupings that would allow reverse engineering of the respondent 
firms’ identities. 
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firms or firms with higher agency costs might also face greater compliance costs that lessen the 
potential net benefit of compliance (Jain and Raezee; 2006). 
We use four measures of firm governance to assess how these findings correspond to 
compliance experience. The first is institutional ownership (InstOwn), defined as the aggregate 
ownership reported by 13-F filers in the most recent fiscal quarter and converted to centile ranks. 
The second is Gindex, the Gompers et al. (2003) Governance index, converted to decile ranks. 
Following the convention in the literature, we interpret lower Gindex and higher InstOwn as 
stronger governance. The third measure is the presence of an outside blockholder 
(OutsideBlock), coded as an indicator variable equal to one when there is at least one blockholder 
(5% beneficial owner) unaffiliated with firm insiders and zero otherwise. The last measure is 
AffiliateBlock, an indicator variable equal to one when a firm insider or founding-family 
members own more than 5% of the company’s stock and zero otherwise.14 We construct the 
OutsideBlock and AffiliateBlock indicators using 13D and 13G EDGAR filings.  
5.1.3. Material Weaknesses and Compliance Experience  
The third set of explanatory variables reflects firm experience with the compliance process 
and outcomes. Following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), we construct two measures for the 
identification and remediation of ICD’s: ICDcurrent, an indicator variable equal to one when the 
firm reports an ICD in the most recently completed filing year; and ICDremediate, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm remediates an ICD in the most recently completed filing year 
(i.e., the firm reported an ICD prior to the most recently completed filing year and not in the 
most recently completed filing year). We also include an indicator variable, Restatement, equal 
to one when the respondent firm restated its financials in the most recently completed filing year. 
Finally, we capture experience through the number of years of Section 404(b) compliance. We 
                                                            
14  As described in more detail in Appendix A, an affiliate block is deemed present if multiple individual 
blockholders with the same last name are present, indicative of a family’s ownership of the firm. 
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use indicators set equal to one when the firm is 404(b)-compliant (404(b)) and it has complied 
with Section 404(b) for two or more (2+ yrs compliant), three or more (3+ yrs compliant), and 
four or more (4+ yrs compliant) years. 
5.1.4. Factors related to potential respondent bias  
In the multiple regression models, we also control for factors that might reflect systematic 
biases in the perceptions of the respondents. The first is the firm’s past performance, because 
good (bad) post-SOX performance might positively (negatively) influence perceptions of the 
impact of Section 404 compliance. We use the firm’s monthly alphas from January 2003 to 
December 2007, ExcessRet, defined as the intercept from the time-series regression of each 
firm’s monthly stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate on Carhart’s (1997) four factors.   
Second, respondents who attained their positions after the passage of the Act or whose firms 
were not publicly traded at that time might have a different frame of reference compared to 
respondents with longer tenure or from mature firms. For instance, respondents that attained their 
position because of SOX-related changes might have a favorably biased impression of the 
compliance effects. We use two indicator variables. The first, Public02, is set equal to one if the 
respondent firm was public in 2002. The second, TenGT5, is set equal to one if the respondent 
had held their current position for at least five years at the time of the survey.  
Finally, the survey invitation allowed the targeted individuals (CEOs, CFOs, and General 
Counsels) to delegate participation in the survey to lower ranked employees familiar with 
Section 404 compliance process. This feature of the survey design can introduce a spurious 
source of variation in the responses and bias our inference, if the delegation varies systematically 
across firms and the reported effects across respondent ranks. There are multiple reasons for this 
concern. First, under Section 302 of the Act, CEOs and CFOs are personally liable for 
misstatements in their firms’ periodic reports. This incremental personal cost might induce 
relatively pessimistic perceptions of the effects of compliance. Second, high rank officers are 
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typically further from the compliance process than other respondents and thus might be less able 
to assess the effects of Section 404 compliance. Conversely, the views of lower rank employees 
might be positively biased, if their positions in the firm depend on SOX and the compliance 
process. Notwithstanding, systematic differences in responses across respondent ranks would 
support the existence of a respondent bias.  
To control for the effect of delegation on the level of the survey responses, we include in 
our models an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is the CEO or CFO (CEOCFO). 
Furthermore, to ensure that our inferences about the determinants of the perceived effects of 
compliance are robust, we estimate our multiple regression models both for the whole sample 
and for the subsample of only CEOs and CFOs. 
5.2. Correlation analysis  
Panel A of Table 3 reports summary statistics for the respondent and firm characteristics, 
while Panel B reports the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix. Other than MVE, CEOCFO, and 
InstOwn, the correlations between firm/respondent characteristics are relatively low. 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between those characteristics 
and the survey responses. Among the firm-complexity measures, MVE displays the largest 
(positive) correlations with the perceived benefits as well as the costs of compliance. That the net 
benefit of compliance is also positively correlated with MVE suggests that the perceived benefits 
increase with firm size at a higher rate than the compliance costs. Both of these results are 
consistent with findings reported by Zhang (2007) and Iliev (2010). GeoDispersion and 
MultiSegment are also positively correlated with many perceived compliance benefits, whereas 
the R&D indicator is negatively correlated with almost all of the perceived compliance effects.  
Among the governance measures, institutional ownership displays the strongest (positive) 
correlation with the perceived benefits. Similarly, there is a positive, albeit smaller correlation 
with OutsideBlock, but almost no significant correlations with AffiliateBlock or Gindex.  
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The survey responses are also significantly correlated with the observed outcomes of 
Section 404 compliance. Perceived benefits are lower for firms reporting the presence of ICDs, 
ICDcurrent, but they are higher for firms reporting remediation of ICDs, ICDremediate. That is, 
respondents recognize higher Section 404 benefits when compliance recently resulted in the 
correction of material weaknesses. Conversely, the occurrence of restatements is only marginally 
correlated with the survey responses.  
Among the remaining factors, we find that compliance benefits are significantly higher 
when post-SOX firm performance is higher, the respondent is not the CEO or CFO, and the 
respondent tenure is less than five years at the time of the survey. Furthermore, there is a 
significant positive correlation between 404(b) compliance and the propensity to recognize 
positive effects, consistent with certification benefits from auditor attestation.  
5.3. Multiple regression analysis of perceived benefits  
Table 4 reports multiple regression estimates for models that relate the survey responses on 
the perceived benefits of Section 404 compliance to firm and respondent characteristics. The 
dependent variable (Benefits) is the average response to the 12 benefits questions, which can 
vary between -1 and 1. The explanatory variables comprise all of the firm and respondent 
characteristics reported in Table 3 with the exception of Gindex, which we drop due to severe 
lack of coverage and otherwise insignificant correlations with the survey responses.  
5.3.1. The effect of firm complexity, governance, and material weaknesses  
The estimates for the base model (Column 1) show a significant relation between firm size 
and the benefits of Section 404 compliance. When MVE increases from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile, there is a 36% increase in the perceived benefits relative to the mean. In contrast, 
MultiSegment and R&D have a statistically significant negative impact. The perceived benefits 
are 14% and 18% lower than the unconditional mean when firms report multiple business 
segments and when R&D increases from the first to the last decile, respectively. 
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The estimated coefficients on InstOwn and AffiliateBlock are not statistically significant, 
whereas the coefficient estimate for OutsideBlock is negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that the perceived benefits of Section 404 compliance are lower when outside 
monitoring is likely to be most effective. 
We also find that remediation of an ICD is a stronger determinant of the perceived benefits 
of compliance than its discovery. Respondents from firms that remediate an ICD recognize 
compliance benefits that are 15% greater than the mean. Moreover, respondents from Section 
404(b)-compliant firms perceive benefits that are 19% higher than the mean, again consistent 
with the existence of certification benefits.  
The results remain largely unchanged when we add industry fixed effects to the model 
(Column 2), although the significance of the coefficient on R&D becomes weaker. This suggests 
that R&D intensive industries disproportionately perceive fewer benefits of compliance, but also 
that the effects of other firm characteristics are otherwise independent of industry affiliation.  
5.3.2. The effect of the respondent’s position and tenure  
Consistent with respondent bias, the perceived benefits of Section 404 compliance vary 
systematically by respondent rank and tenure. CEO and CFO respondents report benefits that are 
71% lower than the mean, whereas respondents with five or more years in the reported position 
perceive benefits that are 36% lower than the mean. Longer tenured respondents in particular 
may be in a better position to observe the full effect of the Act’s provisions. A similar argument 
may apply to respondents from firms that were publicly traded at the time of the Act’s passage in 
2002, but we find that the effect of Public02 is not statistically significant.  
In Columns 3 through 7 we examine more thoroughly whether respondent biases affect the 
estimated relations between the perceived benefits of compliance and firm characteristics. In 
Column 3, we restrict the sample to firms that were public in 2002 (Public02=1), reducing the 
number of observations to 1,834. The coefficient estimates remain largely the same. We further 
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restrict the sample in Column 4 to long-tenured respondents (TenGT5=1), resulting in 1,053 
observations. This affects the coefficient estimates on the ICD indicators: ICDremediate is no 
longer statistically significant, while the effect of ICDcurrent remains negative but becomes 
economically and statistically more significant.  
In Columns 5 through 7, we restrict the sample to CEO and CFO respondents. Although the 
sample sizes decrease dramatically, most of the prior results remain unchanged. Notably, the 
coefficient estimate for 404(b) is largest for the highest ranked, most pessimistic respondents – 
i.e., CEOs and CFOs with tenure longer than 5 years. Moreover, MVE is no longer statistically 
significant because this subsample is mostly comprised of small firms.  
5.3.3. The effect of non-random participation in the survey  
Because the decision to participate in the survey is not random, the last two columns in 
Table 4 report estimates of a selection model based on Heckman (1976) correction for self-
selection. We compute the non-selection hazard (Inverse Mills) ratio from the first-stage probit 
model of the participation decision for the full sample of 8,215 targeted firms. The dependent 
variable in this model is equal to one for the 2,901 firms whose managers participated in the 
survey. The selection equation comprises all of the explanatory variables from the second stage 
model as well as an indicator variable for the 500 randomly selected firms that were targeted for 
follow-on outreach (Phone call), which we use to attain identification of the system.15 
The first-stage estimates show that several of the second-stage variables also explain the 
decision to participate in the survey, including MVE and 404(b). However, the Inverse Mills 
Ratio in the second-stage model is not statistically significant and the coefficient estimates of the 
                                                            
15 We drop ExcessRet from this specification due to lack of coverage among non-respondents. When missing, we 
applied the following rules to the first-stage regressors: Geographic dispersion is equal to the mean; R&D, 
ICDremediate, ICDcurrent, and 404(b) are equal to zero, and MultiSegment is equal to one. When MVE is missing, 
it is equal to the book value of equity if non missing and zero otherwise. We obtain similar second-stage results 
when these treatments are not applied, resulting in the loss of 3,582 observations from the first stage. 
 22 
 
other regressors are not materially affected by the self-selection correction. Therefore, the non-
random survey participation does not appear to affect our earlier inferences. 
5.4. Multiple regression analysis of compliance costs and benefits net of costs 
Table 5 reports estimates of multiple regression models that relate the reported total costs 
(Cost from Table 2, Panel B) and the perceived net benefit (Net Benefit from Table 2, Panel C) of 
Section 404 compliance to firm and respondent characteristics. This analysis has two objectives. 
The first is to assess whether the determinants of the perceived benefits also explain the reported 
costs and, if so, determine their incremental effect on the perceived net benefit. For these models, 
we use the same explanatory variables reported in Table 4 and the reported total cost or 
perceived net benefit for the most recently completed filing year (t=0).  
The second objective is to exploit the time-dimension of the responses to assess the joint 
impact of compliance experience and the June 2007 regulatory reforms – i.e., SEC’s 
management guidance (MG) and PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5). To this end, for both 
the total cost and net benefits, we pool the responses for t=-1 and t=1 with those in the base 
model, t=0. Using responses referring to the prior year is necessary to estimate the effect of the 
2007 reforms because in all but 15 cases the most recently completed filing year was after the 
reforms. We then add indicator variables for the number of years of Section 404(b) compliant 
(1+, 2+, 3+, and 4+ yrs 404(b)) and for whether the corresponding year ends after the 
implementation of the 2007 reforms (PostAS5).  
Although both the costs and net benefit questions refer to three separate years, the responses 
are measured at the same point in time. For the net benefit questions, the responses reflect the 
respondent’s subjective assessment of annual compliance benefits relative to the annual costs as 
recollected at t=1. If recent experiences affect the recollection of the prior-year perceptions of 
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benefits (net of costs), this could bias the responses referring to past years.16 In this case, pooling 
the net benefit responses in the same regression model (i.e., as if they were independent time-
series realizations of the same data-generating process) introduces a respondent-level fixed effect 
that could bias our inferences if the omitted effects are correlated with other covariates of interest 
in the model. We address this issue by including the average response to 12 benefits questions 
from the main survey in the net benefit model to control for the unobserved respondent-level 
time-invariant bias in the observed net benefit responses. Alternatively, we include respondent-
level fixed effects to account for all time-invariant effects on the respondent’s perception of 
benefits, including the effect of recent experiences. In all models with pooled observations, we 
cluster standard errors by respondent to account for respondent-level residual correlations. 
5.4.1. Do the drivers of perceived benefits affect compliance cost and perceived net benefit? 
The estimates in Column 1 of Table 5 show that several determinants of the perceived 
benefits are also significantly related to the reported compliance costs for the most recently 
completed filing year (t=0). The coefficient estimates for three of the four firm-complexity 
measures, MVE, MultiSegment, and GeoDispersion, are positive and statistically significant. The 
same is true for ICDcurrent and ICDremediate. Finally, the presence of an outside blockhoder is 
associated with lower costs, but no other governance measure is statistically significant.  
The coefficient estimates in the net benefit model for t=0 (Column 5) reflect whether the 
typical respondent perceives the incremental benefits associated with changes in each relevant 
dimension to be worth the corresponding incremental costs. Only MVE is significantly positively 
associated with the net benefit of compliance in Column 5. Therefore, at the margin, respondents 
perceive that only the incremental benefits associated with MVE outweigh the corresponding 
incremental costs. By the same logic, the lower net benefit for OutsideBlock firms suggests that 
                                                            
16 A similar issue does not arise with respect to the costs of compliance, if the respondents reported objective 
estimates of the costs associated with each compliance year based on company records. 
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the lower perceived benefits associated with external monitoring in Column 4 more than offset 
the corresponding reduction in compliance costs in Column 1. Net Benefit is also lower for 
Multisegment firms, consistent with the higher costs and lower benefits that respondents from 
these firms ascribe to Section 404 compliance. Finally, the effect of CEOCFO and TenGT5 in 
the net benefit model is negative and statistically significant, in line with the effect on benefits in 
Column 4 and the lack of significant effects on costs in Column 1.  
5.4.2. 404(b) certification benefits and compliance experience  
The evidence in Tables 3 and 4 shows that Section 404(b) compliance is associated with 
significantly higher perceived benefits. This is consistent with the notion that third–party 
certification can temper Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons problem” (see also Viscusi, 1978) and that 
independent auditors enhance the credibility of management disclosures in this capacity (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001).17 Notwithstanding, the requirements of Section 404(b) have been among the 
most controversial aspects of SOX. In Table 5, we further examine the effect of 404(b) 
compliance while controlling for other factors. 
The estimated coefficient on 1+ yrs 404(b) is positive and significant in both the total cost 
and the net benefit models for the most recently completed fiscal year (Columns 1 and 5, 
respectively). Thus, while auditor attestation results in higher compliance costs consistent with 
concerns expressed by its opponents, our estimates also imply that the respondents perceive the 
corresponding incremental – certification – benefits to outweigh the incremental costs.  
The regression estimates in Columns 2 and 6, which are based on the pooled cross-years 
responses as previously discussed, indicate that the effects of 404(b) compliance depend on 
experience. The coefficient estimates for 2+, 3+, and 4+yrs404b in the pooled cost model 
(Column 2) are all negative and significant. The estimates imply that first-time Section 404(b) 
                                                            
17 Booth and Smith (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that underwriters and venture capitalists play 
such a role in the context of initial public offerings. See also Cooney et al. (2003) for seasoned equity offerings in 
Japan. 
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compliance increases costs by 127%, but the compliance cost premium declines by 21%, 44%, 
and 49% after two, three, and four or more years of experience, respectively. Correspondingly, 
the marginal net benefit associated with 404(b)-compliance becomes positive and significant 
after two years of experience, and incrementally more so after four years (Column 6).   
Overall, there is a steady decline in compliance costs as firms gain experience with Section 
404(b) and this is ultimately accompanied by an increase in the perceived net benefit of 
compliance. The decline in compliance costs is consistent with the existence of start-up expenses 
that dissipate over time, an issue that we explore further below.  
5.4.3. Regulatory reforms  
The regulatory reforms of 2007 aimed to reduce uncertainty about Section 404 requirements 
and, possibly, the amount of resources required to comply. The SEC’s management guidance 
(MG) provides guidance on how to comply with the Section 404(a) requirements for 
management assessment of the ICFR and its disclosure.18 The PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No.5 
(AS5) establishes new standards to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the independent 
audit of the ICFR under Section 404(b), particularly through reduced compliance costs.19  
Among those who answered the optional questions on MG and AS5, an overwhelming 
majority, 88%, acknowledge having relied on MG and 94% of those asserted that it was useful 
(Table 2, Panel E). When asked directly, 36% and 50% of respondents associate a reduction in 
compliance costs to MG and AS5, respectively. Unreported cross-sectional tests show that the 
only factors related to the perceived impact of the reforms on compliance costs are MVE and 
compliance experience. Specifically, larger firms, which as a result of the implementation 
                                                            
18 See “Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Under 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Interpretation,” SEC Release, June 20, 2007. 
19 See “SEC Approves PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 Regarding Audits of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting; Adopts Definition of ‘Significant Deficiency,’” SEC Press Release, July 25, 2007. 
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schedule have longer experience with Section 404 compliance, report greater cost reductions and 
more frequent reliance on MG.  
For this reason, in Table 5, we examine the relation between compliance experience and 
effects conditional on the regulatory environment. The estimates in Columns 3 show that, while 
the reforms are associated with higher total costs (positive coefficient on PostAS5), they also 
amplify the inverse relation between compliance experience and costs (PostAS5*yrs404b). 
Despite the higher costs associated with the reforms, the perceived net benefit of compliance is 
significantly higher in the new regime independent of experience (Column 7). Furthermore, the 
coefficient on PostAS5*yrs404b is positive and significant, suggesting that the net effect of 
compliance after the reforms is incrementally more positive for firms with longer experience. 
Overall, the finding that compliance experience and the 2007 reforms are associated with a 
higher net benefit supports the view that there are incremental benefits from learning and lower 
regulatory uncertainty. 
5.4.4. Robustness of net benefit models  
The remaining models in Table 5 address the two concerns about the net benefit responses 
discussed earlier. First, to account for the potential respondent-level fixed effect arising from 
measuring past and present perceptions at the same point in time, Columns 8 and 9 include the 
time-invariant average response to 12 benefits questions and respondent-level fixed effects, 
respectively. The evidence shows that our earlier inferences are robust to the inclusion of these 
additional controls.  
Second, the account for potential selection bias from the placement of the net benefit 
questions in the optional section of the survey, we re-estimate the full Net Benefit model while 
applying Heckman (1976) two-step correction for self-selection (Columns 10 and 11).20 In the 
                                                            
20 In untabulated tests, we apply Rubin’s (1987) multiple imputation method to estimate the missing Net Benefit 
values.  Including these imputed values in the estimation only affects the estimated coefficients on ICDremediate 
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first stage selection model, as an instrument, we use an indicator for whether the respondent 
received a post-survey phone call asking them to reenter the survey. 21  Only this indicator 
variable and Benefits are statistically significant in the first stage model: respondents that are 
more pessimistic on the compliance benefits and that receive follow-up phone calls elect to 
answer the Net benefit questions more frequently. Including the Inverse Mills ratio from the first 
stage selection model in the second stage Net Benefit model does not have a material impact on 
the coefficients that we obtain from OLS estimation in Column 7. 
5.5. Start-up and fixed costs of compliance  
Following the passage of SOX, there was concern that the “one-size-fit-all” nature of the 
requirements might place a disproportionate compliance burden on smaller companies (e.g., 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). To evaluate this conjecture, in Figure 1.a, we plot the mean total 
cost of Section 404 compliance as a fraction of year-end book assets by MVE terciles.  
Consistent with the concern that a large portion of the compliance costs is fixed (i.e., non-
scalable), there is a strong inverse relation between the normalized costs and firm size. However, 
the figure also shows that the ratio of small-to-large firm normalized costs decreases 
substantially after the second year of compliance and reaches a steady-state of about seven-to-
one by the third year. Therefore, a significant portion of the fixed charges are non-recurring (i.e., 
start-up) costs that disappear over time.  
To gain some economic intuition for the relative burden of Section 404 compliance on 
smaller firms in steady-state, we perform a similar exercise using the financial statement audit 
fees unrelated to 404(b) (Figure 1.b). We find that the ratio of small-to-large firm normalized 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and R&D, yielding signs and statistical significance in line with those for the Benefits models in Table 4. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
21 Unlike the instrument used to identify exogenous variation in the decision to participate in the survey, this 
instrument is not randomly determined because the feasibility of the treatment depends on whether the participant 
chose to provide contact information and permission for the Commission to follow-up with additional questions.  
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audit fees is of a similar order of magnitude. Thus, the large relative burden on smaller firms in 
steady-state is not unique to Section 404 requirements.  
6. Correlation between survey responses and ex ante perceptions of SOX 
Existing archival studies document a large, negative market reaction to the passage of SOX 
legislation (e.g., Zhang, 2007) and intense lobbying by firms against strict implementation of its 
provisions (HSV, 2009), evidence that both investors and managers anticipated net costs from 
Act. However, there is also evidence that firms previously less compliant with and more resistant 
to the new rules tend to experience more favorable stock returns around SOX-related events 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; HSV, 2009). In this section, we examine whether these ex 
ante perceptions of the Act correspond to – and corroborate – subsequent views expressed by 
managers through the survey.  
6.1. Abnormal returns around SOX-related events  
We begin by testing whether the respondent’s propensity to recognize compliance benefits 
varies with investor expectations, as measured by their firm’s abnormal stock returns around 
significant SOX-related events. Following Zhang (2007), we estimate respondent firm abnormal 
returns using stock returns of non-U.S.-traded foreign firms as a benchmark.22 We focus on three 
sets of events.23 The first comprises four major SOX legislative events identified by Zhang 
(2007), which capture early investor sentiment on the potential impact of SOX. The second set 
comprises the announcements of the SEC’s rules on Section 404 and the related PCAOB work, 
thus capturing the market reaction to the actual requirements of SOX provisions. The third set 
                                                            
22 Abnormal returns are calculated applying model (1a) from Zhang (2007): Reti,t = a0 + a1CAN_Rett + a2EU_Rett + 
a3EU_Rett+1+ a4AS_Rett + a5AS_Rett+1+ et where Reti,t is the raw return of respondent firm i on date t, U.S. time. 
The CAN_Rett, EU_Rett, and AS_Rett denote returns of Canadian, European, and Asian (including Australia and 
New Zealand) listed firms on date t local time, obtained from Datastream. First, we estimate the model for each 
respondent firm by using the calendar year 2001 (2005) daily return data for the SOX and Section 404 (MG and 
AS5) analysis. We then use the estimated coefficients to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the 
sum of the prediction errors over the relevant event window. To preserve the anonymity of the respondent firms, 
each set of CARs is converted to centile ranks.   
23 See Appendix B for event dates, descriptions, and announcement returns. 
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comprises events related to the passage of SEC’s MG and PCAOB’s AS5. Table 6 reports mean 
CAR’s for the three sets of events in Panel A and their Pearson correlations with the survey 
responses in Panel B.  
The mean CAR around major legislative events identified by Zhang (2007), Zhang events 
CAR, is -1.3%, significant at the 1% level. This is in line with the -1.8% reported by Zhang 
(2007) and the negative average net benefit of compliance documented in Panel C of Table 2. 
Important for our purposes, the reported benefits and net benefit of compliance increase with 
Zhang events CAR’s (Table 6, Panel B). Thus, consistent with correlated beliefs about effects of 
compliance, investors anticipate a more positive (or less negative) net impact from the new rules 
for firms whose managers subsequently perceive greater benefits and net benefit of compliance.  
In contrast to the passage of SOX, the mean cumulative abnormal return around events 
leading to Section 404 implementation, Section 404 CAR, is positive, 1.9%, and statistically 
significant. 24 This reversal relative to SOX events is consistent with the implementation of the 
rules resolving regulatory uncertainty that might have previously depressed valuations – as per 
Zhang’s suggestion that “the market (may have initially) over-estimated the net costs of SOX.” 
This logic also explains the evidence in Panel B of Table 6, which shows a negative correlation 
between Section 404 CAR’s and insiders’ propensity to report compliance benefits. In particular, 
the evidence is consistent with already-compliant firms – those least likely to benefit from the 
new rules – benefiting most from resolution of uncertainty about the compliance costs.  
An alternative explanation for the documented negative correlation is that insiders reporting 
fewer benefits have greater incentive alignment problems with outside shareholders. Thus, 
                                                            
24 One of the four events is the May 27, 2003 adoption of the Section 404 rules by the SEC. In adopting the rules, 
the SEC specified the compliance requirements and the deadlines for various groups of firms (accelerated filers, 
non-accelerated filers, and foreign issuers). Non-accelerated filers were granted a significant delay in their 
compliance deadlines. Both Zhang (2007) and Illiev (2010) consider this delay a benefit to the non-accelerated filers. 
Iliev (2010) further argues that because accelerated filers were also given a later deadline than what the market had 
anticipated, the positive reaction for accelerated filers is consistent with Section 404 imposing a net cost. This 
interpretation cannot be distinguished from the alternative interpretation that the market perceived the final Section 
404 to be more effective and less onerous than anticipated. Our results are not affected when we drop this event date.  
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Section 404 has greater scope to improve governance at these firms, which Section 404 CAR’s 
accurately reflect. However, the negative correlation between the market reaction to Section 404 
rulemaking events and the reported compliance costs is inconsistent with this interpretation, if 
greater scope for correcting deficiencies is also associated with higher compliance costs.  
The mean cumulative abnormal return around the passage of MG and AS5, MGAS5 CAR, is 
-1.4%. This is at odds with the evidence in Panel E of Table 2, which suggests that respondents 
have generally a favorable view of the impact of these measures on the cost of compliance. 
Notably, however, we find no significant correlation between MGAS5 CAR’s and the survey 
responses, consistent with these events conveying no information to the market about the 
beneficial effects of Section 404 compliance. 
6.2. Lobbying against strict implementation of SOX  
Next, we examine the relation between the survey responses and firm propensity to lobby 
against strict implementation of the rules under Titles III (Corporate Responsibility) and IV 
(Enhanced Financial Disclosures) of SOX. Of the 2,901 respondent firms, 174 (6%) lobbied 
against strict implementation of the rules under Titles III or IV of SOX, as defined by HSV. The 
correlations in Table 6, Panel B, show that respondents from lobbying firms perceive greater 
compliance benefits, on average, than respondents from non-lobbying firms. The largest positive 
correlations are with responses about the net benefit of compliance, the quality of the internal 
control structure, and the audit committee’s confidence in the ICFR.  
That ex ante lobbying predicts greater ex post recognition of compliance benefits has 
several possible interpretations. First, consistent with HSV’s conclusion that lobbying propensity 
is highest among firms whose investors would benefit most from the new rules, insiders may 
have changed their views. In particular, firms might have underweighted the potential benefits 
from the new requirements, while focusing mainly on the immediate costs. The positive 
 31 
 
correlation between firm lobbying propensity and compliance costs is consistent with this 
interpretation.  
 Second, the evidence could indicate that firms’ lobbying was effective, in the sense that the 
final implementation of Section 404 rules was to their advantage. This explanation is consistent 
with insiders from these firms realizing (and thus perceiving) the greatest benefits of compliance. 
However, we find no statistically significant relation (untabulated) between the lobbying 
propensity and Section 404 CAR’s, which this explanation would imply.    
Third, it is possible that survey respondents are drawn from a different population of 
executives at lobbying firms and, thus, their views might have no bearings on the firm’s past 
decision to lobby against strict implementation of SOX. If so, then the evidence reflects a 
“difference in views” rather than a “change of views.” However, the positive relation becomes 
stronger when we restrict the analysis (untabulated) to longer tenured respondents (TenGT5=1), 
which is more consistent with insider views evolving. 
Finally, as HSV show, large firms were more likely to lobby against strict implementation 
of SOX rules. Although larger firms have greater potential for agency problems, they also have 
greater resources to fund lobbying activities. Small firms might have had similar views but fewer 
resources to vocalize them. Hence, the direct relation between lobbying propensity and ex post 
perceived benefits would reflect firms’ differential ability to fund lobbying activities rather than 
a systematic relation between ex ante and ex post views. We cannot rule out this interpretation.    
More broadly, in untabulated multiple regression analysis, we find that the simple 
correlations between the perceived compliance effects and the lobbying propensity or CARs are 
explained away by factors (e.g., size) shown to affect investor and insider ex ante views. 
7. The relation between survey responses and changes in firm information environment 
Our earlier tests show that most respondents perceive compliance benefits, and that the 
propensity to do so increases with compliance experience and remediation of ICDs identified 
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through Section 404 requirements. Here we examine whether the perceived benefits are more 
broadly related to observable improvements in the quality of firms’ information environments 
following the passage of SOX. We consider four empirical proxies for the quality of firm 
information environment and measure changes from the pre-SOX (1997–2001) to post-SOX 
(2003–2007) period, excluding the year of enactment (2002).  
The first measure is accruals quality, which Doyle et al. (2007a) show to be associated with 
the quality of internal controls. Following their definition, we measure accruals quality as the 
time-series standard deviation of the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) abnormal discretionary 
accruals. We then transform changes around SOX into centile ranks, with lower rankings 
indicating larger improvements in the quality of reported earnings following the passage of SOX.  
The second measure is the liquidity of the respondent firm’s common stock, which theory 
suggests improves price informativeness (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1993) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show to be directly associated with disclosure 
quality. Following Ferreira et al. (2011), we use the Amihud (2002) price-impact measure. The 
changes in this measure around SOX are transformed into decile ranks, with higher ranks 
representing improvements in the post-SOX information environment (i.e., higher liquidity).  
The third measure is the respondent firm’s equity beta. Several studies indicate that higher 
quality information environments should result in lower systematic risk (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2009; Barry and Brown, 1984; Coles et al., 1995; Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz and Schrand, 
2008). We estimate the firm-level market factor betas pre- and post-SOX using the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model. We compute the differences and transform them into centile ranks, 
with lower ranks representing improvements in the post-SOX information environment. 
The last measure is firm-specific return variation, defined as the logistic transformation of 1-
R2 from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Previous studies suggest that firms with high 
quality information environments have a low R2, because their returns reflect more firm-specific 
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information and depend less on market movements (e.g., Durnev et al., 2003; Jin and Myers, 
2006; Morck et al., 2000). 25 We convert the changes in this measure around SOX to centile 
ranks, with higher ranks representing improvements in the post-SOX information environment. 
Both liquidity and equity beta are positively correlated with the perceived benefits of 
compliance (Panel B, Table 6). Improvements in accruals quality are also positively correlated 
with the perceived benefits, but the correlations are not statistically significant. 26  Finally, 
increases in the logistic transformation of 1-R2 are negatively correlated with the perceived 
benefits. This is in contrast to the prediction that higher firm-specific return variation, reflecting 
higher quality of the information environment, should be associated with higher benefits of 
compliance. One possible explanation is that the passage of SOX is associated with an increase 
in the amount of noise trading that more than offsets the effects of improved disclosure quality. 
Alternatively, because R2 does not distinguish between the effects of private and public (firm-
specific) information flows on returns, it is possible that Section 404-related improvements in the 
firms’ information environments reduce the former more than they increase the latter. We obtain 
qualitatively similar results for the Net Benefit measure. This is noteworthy because we find that 
reported compliance costs also increase with changes in the quality of firms’ information 
environments, consistent with effective compliance requiring greater expenditures.  
Consistent with the analysis in the previous section, when we control for firm size and other 
factors (untabulated), none of the information environment measures is significantly correlated 
with the perceived effects of compliance. This is consistent with changes to the quality of firms’ 
information environments reflecting the same underlying economic factors that shape 
respondents’ ex post perceptions. 
 
                                                            
25 We recognize that, as Roll (1988) articulates, R2 can also be low because of increased noise trading unrelated to 
firm fundamentals, suggesting a potential alternative interpretation. 
26 However, in this case, our tests have less power to detect an association due to more stringent data requirements. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the responses of corporate executives to a survey conducted by the 
SEC to assess their experience with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002. This 
analysis provides a unique perspective on the effects of SOX and sheds new light on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the requirements of Section 404.  
We find that corporate insiders, who as a group initially displayed strong criticism toward 
the new rules, widely perceive Section 404 compliance to improve the firm internal governance. 
More than two-thirds of respondents acknowledge positive effects from Section 404 compliance. 
Nonetheless, the costs of compliance are non-trivial and respondents perceive that the 
compliance burden more than outweighs the benefits, on average.  
Insiders’ views are far from homogeneous and vary systematically across firms and 
respondent ranks. Notably, CEO and CFO respondents are the most pessimistic. Controlling for 
this potential bias, we document that benefits increase with the size and scope of the firm’s 
operations (firm size and geographical dispersion), but decrease with the complexity of the 
firm’s business/production (multiple business segments and R&D expenditures).  
Consistent with concerns about the ‘one-size-fits-all’ nature of the requirements of Section 
IV of SOX, we find evidence of fixed costs that weigh disproportionately on smaller firms. 
Nevertheless, we also document for the first time that part of these non-scalable costs are non-
recurring start-up expenses that dissipate over time. In particular, compliance experience is 
associated with lower costs and a higher net benefit of compliance, and this effect is amplified by 
lower regulatory uncertainty.  
Overall, our results suggest caution when drawing conclusions about the economic 
consequences of substantive reforms of disclosure rules from firms’ early compliance 
experiences and pre-compliance expectations. 
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Table 1 - Survey participation by respondents’ firm industry, title, and tenure.  
 
Panel A: Respondent firm industry           Panel B: Respondent title and tenure 
    N 
Response 
rate           N 
Response 
rate       N 
Fabricated Products 13 62%  Business Services 411 36%  Title of respondent  
Tobacco Products 7 57%  Electrical Equipment 138 36%  Chief Executive Officer 205 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip 14 57%  Wholesale 200 36%  Chief Financial Officer 922 
Coal 20 55%  Construction Materials 100 34%  Chief Accounting Officer 216 
Aircraft 37 54%  Food Products 145 33%  Chief Operating Officer 5 
Banking 810 50%  Pharmaceutical Products 549 33%  Chief Compliance Officer 64 
Defense 14 50%  Machinery 211 33%  Chief Risk Officer 44 
Utilities 155 50%  Computer Software  517 32%  Controller 291 
Personal Services 61 49%  Paper Business Supplies 57 32%  VP of Finance 88 
Measuring and Control Equip 122 46%  Construction 115 31%  General Counsel 60 
Textiles 24 46%  Other 45 31%  Audit Committee member 5 
Retail  243 44%  Candy & Soda 23 30%  Other 1,001 
Insurance 203 43%  Real Estate 60 30%  Total 2,901 
Shipping Containers 12 42%  Consumer Goods 124 30%    
Chemicals 142 41%  Precious Metals 81 30%  Tenure of respondent  
Automobiles and Trucks 74 41%  Healthcare 186 29%  One year or less 232 
Medical Equipment 242 40%  Beer & Liquor 18 28%  Two years 476 
Financial Trading 345 40%  Agriculture 35 26%  Three or four years 668 
Electronic Equipment 393 39%  Tel communications 287 25%  Five or more years 1,519 
Transportation 197 38%  Apparel 166 23%  No response 6 
Computer Hardware 124 38%  Printing and Publishing 75 23%  Total 2,901 
Non-Metallic & Metal Mining 81 37%  Entertainment 197 19%    
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 105 36%  Recreation 310 17%    
Petroleum and Natural Gas 347 36%  Steel Works 336 16%    
Rubber and Plastic Products 45 36%   All industries 8,215 35%       
The sample comprises 8,215 operating companies that were SEC filers reporting on forms 10-K, 10-KSB, 20-F, or 40-F in both calendar years 2006 and 2007 for 
which stock-price data could be obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream as of October 2008. Panel A reports the number of respondent firms and the 
percent response rate within each of the Fama-French’s (1997) 49 industries. Panel B lists the number of respondents by title and tenure. When respondents claim 
more than one title, the highest title rank – defined by the listing in the Table – is assigned for that respondent. When more than one respondent exists from the 
same respondent firm, only the highest-ranking respondent is reported. “Other” describes a respondent who self-reported as fitting none of the menu choices 
provided in the survey. 
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Table 2 - Survey responses to questions on the Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefit of Section 404 compliance.  
 
Panel A: Benefits. “To the best of your knowledge, what impact has complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act had on the following?” (3 point scale: -1=negative impact; 0=no impact; +1=positive impact) 
  N Mean % positive 
1. The quality of your company's internal control structure 2,820 0.72 73.0% 
2. The audit committee's confidence in the company's ICFR 2,640 0.70 70.7% 
3. The quality of your company's financial reporting 2,779 0.47 47.9% 
4. Your company's ability to prevent and detect fraud 2,733 0.46 47.1% 
5. Your company’s ability to raise capital 2,186 0.05 8.9% 
6. Investor confidence in your company 2,277 0.22 23.7% 
7. Liquidity of your company's common stock 2,261 -0.01 3.7% 
8. Your confidence in the financial reports of other 404 compliant companies 2,618 0.37 39.0% 
9. Efficiency of your company's operation 2,769 0.01 29.1% 
10. The efficiency of your company's financial reporting process 2,732 -0.17 13.4% 
11. Timeliness of your company's financial statement audit 2,727 -0.13 20.5% 
12. Your company's overall firm value 2,416 0.02 14.5% 
Average response to all questions 2,901 0.21 66.6% 
 
Panel B: Costs ($ millions) from most recently completed reporting year. 
  N Mean Median StdDev 
A.Section 404(b) related audit fees  2,261 0.443 0.138 1.031 
 – Accelerated filers only 1,454 0.676 0.311 1.217 
 – Fraction of total audit fees 1,454 0.350 0.340 0.145 
B.Internal labor ($50/hr)  2,378 0.434 0.121 1.082 
C.Outside consultants and vendors  2,726 0.208 0.055 0.459 
D.All other reported expenses  2,451 0.083 0.014 0.211 
Total cost (A+B+C+D)  1,760 1.207 0.450 2.463 
Total cost - prior reporting year  1,559 1.444 0.509 2.821 
Total cost - reporting year in progress (expected)  1,644 1.050 0.387 2.182 
 
Panel C: Net Benefit. "For your company, how have the benefits of complying with Section 404 compared with the 
costs of complying?" (7 point scale: -3=costs far outweigh the benefits; 0=no net benefit; +3=benefits far outweigh 
the costs) 
  N Mean % positive 
Prior reporting year 934 -1.28 10.2% 
Most recently completed reporting year 1,066 -0.94 18.6% 
Reporting year in progress (expected) 1,075 -0.70 25.8% 
 
Panel D: Pearson correlation coefficients between responses for the most recently completed reporting year 
  1 2 3 
1: Average response to 12 questions in Panel A 1.00   
2: Net benefit  0.63 1.00  
3: Total compliance costs  0.14 0.13 1.00 
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– Table 2, continued from previous page – 
Panel E: Impact of the 2007 SEC and PCAOB guidance.  
 Have you relied 
on MG? 
Have you found 
MG useful? 
 Impact of MG on 
compliance cost 
Impact of AS5 on 
compliance cost 
N 914 803  979 992 
Yes: 1 88% 94%    
Decrease: -1    36% 50% 
None: 0    58% 41% 
Increase: 1    6% 9% 
 
N is the number of respondents, Mean is the average response, and % positive is the fraction of the responses citing a 
positive impact. Panel A responses “not sure” and “not applicable” are coded as zeros in the calculation of the average of 
all 12 responses provided in the final row, and omitted in all other rows. Panel B reports the estimated Section 404 
compliance costs by component and reporting year. “Not applicable” responses are set to zero. “Could not estimate” 
responses for the outside consultants and miscellaneous costs are set to the predicted values from a Tobit regression of 
observed costs on total assets, their square, and their compliance year. Panels B and C questions ask the respondent to 
provide an answer for the current reporting year (the most recently completed fiscal reporting year at the time of the 
survey, either 2007 or 2008), the prior reporting year, and the expected effects for the next reporting year. Panel D 
reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between each set of questions for the current reporting year. Panel E 
summarizes the survey responses to the questions about the perceived impact of the Section 404 reforms introduced in 
June 2007 by the SEC (management guidance, MG) and the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5).
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Table 3 – Firm characteristics and correlations.  
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 404(b) MVE 
GeoDisp
ersion R&D 
Multi_ 
Segment
Inst  
Own 
Outside 
Block 
Affiliate 
Block 
ICD 
remediate
ICD 
current
Restate 
ment 
Excess 
Ret TenGT5
G 
index 
N 2,897 2,733 2,489 2,680 2,502 2,901 2,900 2,900 2,872 2,872 2,901 2,741 2,898 935 
Mean 0.72 19.65 6.60 0.13 1.40 0.34 0.85 0.38 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.52 9.08 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients between firm characteristics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.404(b) 1.00               
2.MVE 0.70 1.00              
3.GeoDispersion 0.12 0.22 1.00             
4.R&D -0.05 -0.07 0.39 1.00            
5.MultiSegment 0.15 0.26 0.07 -0.01 1.00           
6.InstOwn 0.40 0.41 0.08 -0.01 0.17 1.00          
7.OutsideBlock 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.20 1.00         
8.AffiliateBlock -0.07 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 1.00        
9.ICDremediate 0.20    0.07    0.10    0.03    0.01    0.12    0.07 0.02 1.00       
10.ICDcurrent -0.21  -0.21    0.03    0.04  -0.04  -0.12  -0.01    0.02 -0.13 1.00      
11.Restatement -0.07  -0.10  -0.05    0.00    0.00  -0.07    0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 1.00     
12.ExcessRet -0.22 -0.12 0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.08 0.10 0.00 1.00    
13.TenGT5 0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 1.00   
14.Gindex 0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.11 0.05 -0.02 -0.15 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.00  
15.CEOCFO -0.35 -0.43 -0.07 0.05 -0.13 -0.22 -0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.13 -0.20 1.00 
 
Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients between survey responses and firm characteristics 
 
 404(b) MVE 
Geo 
Disper
-sion R&D 
Multi 
Segment
Inst 
Own 
Outside 
Block 
Affiliate 
Block 
ICD 
remed-
iate 
ICD 
current 
Restate-
ment 
Excess 
Ret 
Ten 
GT5 
G 
index 
Benefits: “To the best of your knowledge, what impact has complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had on the following?” 
Quality of ICFR 0.24 0.23 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 0.06 
Audit committee's confidence  0.28 0.26 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 
Quality financial reporting 0.20 0.19 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 
Ability to prevent/detect fraud 0.13 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 
Ability to raise capital 0.13 0.14 0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 
Investor confidence  0.19 0.22 0.04 -0.09 0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 
Liquidity of common stock 0.13 0.16 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.06 
Confidence in other companies 0.18 0.17 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 
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Efficiency of operations 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 
Efficiency financial reporting  0.08 0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 
Timeliness of audit 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 
Overall firm value 0.16 0.20 0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 
Average of all responses 0.24 0.26 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 
  
Net Benefit: "For your company, how have the benefits of complying with Section 404 compared with the costs of complying?" 
Prior reporting year 0.21 0.22 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 
Just completed reporting year 0.32 0.33 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 
Reporting year in progress 0.23 0.31 0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.15 0.02 -0.08 -0.11 0.03 
  
Costs: Respondent company total Section 404 compliance costs ($ millions) 
Prior reporting year 0.65 0.73 0.24 -0.03 0.30 0.37 0.13 -0.09 0.16 0.08 -0.03 -0.19 0.01 0.06 
Just completed reporting year 0.61 0.70 0.27 -0.01 0.31 0.38 0.16 -0.08 0.16 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.06 0.07 
Reporting year in progress 0.43 0.61 0.28 0.00 0.30 0.28 0.09 -0.12 0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 0.08 0.06 
Panel A reports the mean company characteristics. 404(b) is an indicator variable set equal to one for 404(b) compliant respondent companies at the time of the 
survey, and zero otherwise. MVE is the log of the respondent company’s market value of equity. GeoDispersion is the weighted-average distance between the 
company’s regions of operations listed in its 10-K and its headquarters. R&D is research and development expenses scaled by total assets and is equal to zero 
when no research and development expenses are reported. MultiSegment is an indicator variable equal to one when the number of unique business segments 
reported by Compustat is greater than one, and zero otherwise or when not reported. InstOwn is the aggregate institutional ownership of all 13F reporting 
institutions. OutsideBlock is an indicator variable equal to one when at least one 5% shareholder unaffiliated with the firm’s insiders is reported in a 13G or 13D 
SEC filing in the year concurrent with the survey. AffiliateBlock is an indicator variable equal to one when a blockholder affiliated with the firm’s insiders is 
reported in a 13G or 13D SEC filing in the year concurrent with the survey. ICDremediate is an indicator variable equal to one when an internal control deficiency 
reported in a prior year has been remediated, and zero otherwise. ICDcurrent is an indicator variable equal to one when an internal control deficiency is reported 
under Section 404 in the current year, and zero otherwise. Restatement is an indicator variable equal to one when a company has restated any of its financials in an 
amended filing or 8-K disclosure, and zero otherwise. ExcessRet is the monthly average alpha from the Carhart four-factor model in the post-SOX period (2003–
2007), calculated using only months where returns data are available. TenGT5 is an indicator variable set equal to one for respondents with at least five years 
tenure in their current position at the time of the survey, and zero otherwise. G index is the corporate governance index defined by Gompers et al. (2003). 
CEOCFO is an indicator variable equal to one when the respondent is either the CEO or the CFO, and zero otherwise. All of the variables are constructed using 
the most recently available data at the time of the corresponding survey response. Panel B reports the Pearson Correlation coefficients between firm 
characteristics, obfuscated into decile or centile rankings according to Appendix A. Panel C reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between these obfuscated 
measures and the responses to the survey questions reported in Table 2. The bold-faced values indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 – Determinants of perceived benefits.  
 OLS (Dependent variable = Benefits)  Selection Model 
  Industry Public02=1 Public02=1 CEOCFO=1 CEOCFO=1 CEOCFO=1  1st Stage 2nd stage 
  FE  TenGT5=1  Public02=1 Public02=1  Probit OLS 
             TenGT5=1  (Respond=1) (Benefits) 
404(b)  0.040** 0.038* 0.068*** 0.055* 0.031 0.067* 0.085** 0.114** 0.036*
 (1.97) (1.86) (2.83) (1.76) (1.01) (1.81) (1.98) (2.00) (1.82)
MVE 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.017** 0.005 -0.001 0.049*** 0.013***
 (4.03) (3.79) (2.88) (2.59) (2.46) (0.64) (-0.07) (3.90) (4.25)
GeoDispersion 0.001 0.001** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.052*** 0.001*
 (1.60) (2.23) (0.36) (-0.56) (1.31) (1.11) (1.01) (-3.18) (1.95)
R&D -0.005*** -0.005* -0.006*** -0.005** -0.006** -0.008** -0.010** 0.023 -0.005***
 (-2.79) (-1.66) (-3.03) (-2.13) (-1.98) (-2.35) (-2.43) (0.83) (-2.99)
MultiSegment -0.030* -0.032* -0.027 -0.030 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.159*** -0.020
 (-1.83) (-1.86) (-1.57) (-1.33) (0.04) (0.22) (0.19) (3.06) (-1.23)
InstOwn -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.129* -0.000
 (-0.20) (0.14) (-0.79) (-0.38) (-0.91) (-0.66) (-0.37) (-1.79) (-0.49)
OutsideBlock -0.047** -0.041* -0.050** -0.110*** 0.014 0.057 -0.019 0.114*** -0.044**
 (-2.31) (-1.92) (-2.15) (-3.98) (0.40) (1.27) (-0.38) (2.64) (-2.14)
AffiliateBlock 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.003 -0.014 -0.032 0.008
 (0.66) (0.72) (0.75) (0.73) (0.01) (0.11) (-0.49) (-0.97) (0.70)
ICDremediate 0.032* 0.033** 0.035** 0.018 0.007 0.015 -0.030 0.109** 0.033**
 (1.93) (1.99) (2.02) (0.76) (0.19) (0.40) (-0.67) (2.28) (1.97)
ICDcurrent -0.015 -0.020 -0.034 -0.087** -0.066* -0.065 -0.145*** -0.085 -0.014
 (-0.60) (-0.80) (-1.13) (-2.06) (-1.91) (-1.46) (-2.79) (-1.61) (-0.58)
Restatement 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.022 -0.029 -0.022 0.073 -0.087 -0.011
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.42) (-0.50) (-0.33) (1.07) (-1.56) (-0.32)
ExcessRet -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
 (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.18) (0.18) (-0.12) (-0.78) (-0.29)
Public02 -0.021 -0.022 -0.007 0.071 -0.030**
 (-1.33) (-1.35) (-0.29) (0.49) (-2.07)
TenGT5 -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.093*** -0.082*** -0.075***
 (-5.88) (-5.95) (-5.05) (-4.05) (-2.86) (-6.05)
CEOCFO  -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.147***
 (-10.10) (-10.04) (-8.44) (-6.98) (-10.33)
Mills Ratio   0.010
   (0.14)
Phone call   0.619***
   (9.85)
Constant 0.271*** 0.256*** 0.263*** 0.251*** 0.077 0.076 0.084 -1.056*** 0.264***
 (8.96) (7.28) (7.13) (5.46) (1.62) (1.16) (1.15) (-5.40) (4.43)
Observations 2367 2363 1834 1053 836 588 393  8206 2467 
R-squared 0.140 0.158 0.139 0.153 0.061 0.056 0.060  0.167 0.138 
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The table reports the estimation results of the regressions that examine the determinants of cross-sectional variation in the average response to the 12 perceived 
compliance-effect (Benefits) questions. Public02 is an indicator variable equal to one when a respondent was publicly traded when the SOX legislation passed, 
and zero otherwise. All of the other explanatory variables are as described in Table 3. The first seven columns report OLS estimates. The base regression in 
Column 1 comprises all observations with non-missing values for the explanatory variables. Column 2 specification includes industry fixed effects (Industry FE). 
Columns 3 through 7 restrict the sample by using the combinations of whether the respondent firms were public in 2002 (Public02=1), the respondents held their 
current positions at least five years (TenGT5=1), and the respondents are either the CEO or the CFO (CEOCFO=1). The t-statistics based on the White corrected 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Columns 8 and 9 report a selection model using the Heckman correction. The non-selection hazard (Mills Ratio) is 
calculated from the first stage Probit regression where the dependent variable is set equal to one if an insider at one of the 8,206 candidate firms responded to the 
survey (Respond), and zero otherwise. Footnote 13 describes the treatment of missing values. The first-stage instrument, Phone call, is an indicator variable set 
equal to one if the candidate firm received a phone call to encourage participation, and zero otherwise. The second stage OLS estimation uses the column 1 
specification and includes the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage. The Selection Model excludes ExcessRet due to severe lack of coverage among non-
respondent firms. All non-indicator variables are converted to either decile or centile rankings as described in Appendix A. The ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 5 – Determinants of the reported compliance costs and the benefits net of costs.  
 
  OLS  
Cost 
  OLS 
Benefits 
 OLS 
Net Benefit 
Selection Model  
Net Benefit 
 t=0 t=-1,0,1 t=-1,0,1  t=0  t=0 t=-1,0,1 t=-1,0,1 t=-1,0,1 t=-1,0,1  1st stage 
Respond 
NB=1 
2nd stage 
1+ yrs404b 0.587*** 1.269*** 1.420***  0.094***  0.377** -0.006 -0.014 -0.254 -0.388  -0.284* -0.042 
 (6.23) (14.29) (14.77)  (2.86)  (2.12) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-1.49) (-1.56)  (-1.73) (-0.22) 
2+ yrs404b   -0.209*** -0.237***     0.267* 0.101 0.131 0.135  0.127 0.083 
  (-4.04) (-3.79)     (1.94) (0.73) (0.98) (0.88)  (0.69) (0.60) 
3+ yrs404b   -0.232*** -0.090     0.012 0.127 0.061 0.083  -0.012 0.125 
  (-3.95) (-1.64)     (0.10) (1.22) (0.65) (0.67)  (-0.08) (1.20) 
4+ yrs404b   -0.052** -0.096     0.584*** -0.088 -0.128 -0.044  0.068 -0.109 
  (-2.53) (-1.16)     (12.69) (-0.67) (-1.20) (-0.39)  (0.53) (-0.83) 
PostAS5   0.543***      0.198** 0.157* 0.243**   0.198** 
   (7.51)      (2.10) (1.74) (2.54)   (2.12) 
PostAS5*yrs404b   -0.100***      0.131*** 0.145*** 0.097***   0.137*** 
   (-3.72)      (3.65) (4.37) (2.71)   (3.85) 
MVE 0.263*** 0.250*** 0.262***  0.010*  0.063** 0.016 0.031 0.007 -0.046  0.020 0.034 
 (16.88) (18.61) (18.59)  (1.73)  (2.18) (0.69) (1.29) (0.35) (-1.47)  (1.14) (1.42) 
GeoDispersion 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***  0.001  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
 (6.31) (7.86) (7.86)  (0.89)  (0.28) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.74)   (-0.52) (-0.01) 
R&D -0.001 -0.008 -0.008  -0.003  -0.007 -0.013 -0.012 -0.003 -0.022  0.005 -0.013 
 (-0.04) (-1.03) (-0.97)  (-0.88)  (-0.47) (-0.97) (-0.89) (-0.26) (-0.89)  (0.60) (-0.96) 
MultiSegment 0.413*** 0.443*** 0.431***  -0.025  -0.258** -0.184 -0.200* -0.136   0.137 -0.175 
 (5.29) (5.91) (5.75)  (-0.94)  (-2.03) (-1.61) (-1.75) (-1.46)   (1.64) (-1.52) 
InstOwn 0.001 0.001 0.001  -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.20)  (-0.36)  (-0.38) (-1.15) (-0.95) (-0.85) (-1.04)  (-1.45) (-1.01) 
OutsideBlock -0.215** -0.167* -0.169*  -0.069**  -0.354** -0.326** -0.320** -0.143   -0.148 -0.331** 
 (-1.98) (-1.68) (-1.72)  (-2.18)  (-2.11) (-2.29) (-2.27) (-1.28)   (-1.49) (-2.37) 
ActiveBlock 0.009 -0.052 -0.048  0.011  0.063 0.063 0.066 0.036   0.041 0.051 
 (0.15) (-0.96) (-0.91)  (0.52)  (0.60) (0.66) (0.70) (0.47)   (0.64) (0.54) 
ICDremediate 0.132* 0.224*** 0.225***  -0.011  0.055 0.042 0.059 0.068 0.301  0.046 0.064 
 (1.66) (3.40) (3.41)  (-0.39)  (0.43) (0.38) (0.54) (0.73) (1.24)  (0.51) (0.59) 
ICDcurrent 0.198 0.296*** 0.253***  -0.012  -0.067 -0.232* -0.206 -0.160 0.093  0.074 -0.188 
 (1.46) (3.15) (2.64)  (-0.27)  (-0.35) (-1.74) (-1.52) (-1.26) (0.48)  (0.62) (-1.42) 
Restatement 0.373** 0.065 0.018  0.016  0.234 0.178 0.139 0.036 0.014  0.186 0.138 
 (2.42) (0.55) (0.15)  (0.29)  (0.74) (0.80) (0.62) (0.21) (0.08)  (0.95) (0.63) 
ExcessRet -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006***  -0.000  -0.005** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002   -0.001 -0.002 
 (-4.47) (-5.44) (-5.67)  (-0.42)  (-2.57) (-0.84) (-1.16) (-1.24)   (-0.15) (-1.13) 
Public02 0.151** 0.198*** 0.220***  -0.026  0.222* 0.024 0.088 0.175*   -0.005 0.089 
 (2.06) (2.83) (3.11)  (-1.03)  (1.79) (0.21) (0.76) (1.90)   (-0.07) (0.78) 
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This table reports the OLS estimation results where the dependent variable is the log of the reported compliance cost in dollars (Total Cost; Columns 1-3), 
perceived benefits (Benefits; Column 4), and perceived compliance benefit net of cost (Net Benefit; Columns 5 - 8), and. Columns 9 and 10 report a selection 
model for Net Benefit using the Heckman correction. The non-selection hazard (Mills Ratio) is calculated from the first stage Probit regression where the 
dependent variable is set equal to one if the respondent elected to participate in the optional section of the survey (Respond), and zero otherwise. The first-stage 
instrument, Follow-up, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the respondent received a phone call to encourage participation in the optional section, and zero 
otherwise. The second stage OLS estimation includes the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage. Columns 2-3 and 6-8 include Total Cost and Net Benefit 
responses reported for the year prior to the most recently completed reporting year (t=-1) and for the current reporting year (t=1). All other columns include 
responses from only the most recently completed reporting year (t=0). PostAS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the dependent variable corresponds to a 
compliance date after the passage of both the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 5 and the SEC’s management guidance. 1+yrs, 2+yrs, 3+yrs, and 4+yrs 404b are 
indicator variables equal to one when a respondent firm has the corresponding number of years of Section 404(b) compliance experience in the compliance year 
corresponding to the response, and zero otherwise. Yrs404b is the respondent firm’s number of years of Section 404(b) compliance experience. All of the other 
explanatory variables are defined in the previous tables and constructed separately for each of the three compliance years with the exception of GeoDispersion, 
MultiSegment, OutsideBlock, AffiliateBlock, and ExcessRet, which are measured at t=0. The t-statistics based on the standard errors corrected for respondent 
clustering are reported in parenthesis. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
TenGT5 -0.025 0.010 0.018  -0.034*  -0.203** -0.233** -0.226** -0.126*   0.045 -0.228** 
 (-0.44) (0.19) (0.33)  (-1.67)  (-1.99) (-2.50) (-2.42) (-1.70)   (0.69) (-2.45) 
CEOCFO -0.023 -0.057 -0.054  -0.200***  -0.797*** -0.820*** -0.822*** -0.281***   -0.081 -0.814*** 
 (-0.36) (-0.97) (-0.91)  (-8.49)  (-6.93) (-7.79) (-7.83) (-3.14)   (-1.09) (-7.88) 
Follow-up             2.574***  
             (21.04)  
Benefits          2.664***   -0.404***  
          (19.33)   (-3.77)  
Mills Ratio              -0.560*** 
              (-3.92) 
Constant 11.035*** 10.809*** 10.401***  0.242***  -0.698*** -0.548** -0.757*** -1.406*** -0.629***  -0.472*** -0.477** 
  (73.25) (80.23) (67.81)  (5.01)  (-2.67) (-2.53) (-3.40) (-7.65) (-2.38)  (-3.02) (-2.08) 
Respondent FE No No No  No  No No No No Yes  No No 
N firms 1415 1415 1415  884  884 884 884 884 884  2367 884 
N  1415 4049 4049  884  884 2561 2561 2561 2561  2367 2561 
Adj. R2 0.517 0.548 0.557   0.193  0.177 0.157 0.188 0.254 0.871     0.201 
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Table 6 – Correlations between survey responses and either ex ante perceptions or changes in firm information environment quality.  
 
Panel A: Ex ante perceptions and changes in the firms’ information environments. 
 SOX-related CAR Lobbied 
Against 
 SOX 
Pre- to Post-SOX change 
  
Zhang  
(2007) 
Section 
404 
MG  
AS5 Accruals Liquidity Beta 
Return 
variation 
N 1,185 1,896 2,245 2,901 851 1.327 1,327 1,327 
Mean  -0.013*** 0.019*** -0.014*** 0.06 1.79 -0.01 0.06 0.01 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients between the survey responses and either the ex ante perceptions or changes in the respondent firms’ 
information environments. 
  SOX-related event CAR Lobbied 
against 
SOX 
Pre- to Post-SOX change 
  
Zhang 
(2007) 
Section 
404 
MG 
AS5 Accruals Liquidity Beta 
Return 
variation 
Benefits: “To the best of your knowledge, what impact has complying with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had on the following?” 
Quality of your company's internal control structure 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
Audit committee's confidence in the company's ICFR 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 
Quality of your company's financial reporting 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
Ability to prevent and detect fraud 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
Ability to raise capital 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.03 
Investor confidence in your company 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.11 -0.05 
Liquidity of your company's common stock 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 
Your confidence in the financial reports of other 404-compliant 
companies 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 
Efficiency of your company's operation -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
Efficiency of your company's financial reporting  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.05 
Timeliness of financial statement audit 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 
Your company's overall firm value 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
Average of the responses (N/A & not sure =0) 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 
Net Benefit: "For your company, how have the benefits of complying with Section 404 compared with the costs of complying?" 
Prior reporting year 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Current reporting year 0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 -0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.09 
Expected in next reporting year 0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 -0.10 
Costs: Respondent company total Section 404 compliance costs ($ 
millions)          
Prior reporting year 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.24 -0.13 0.11 -0.02 -0.16 
Current reporting year 0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.24 -0.14 0.16 0.01 -0.15 
Expected in next reporting year 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.22 -0.08 0.12 0.02 -0.13 
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– Table 6, continued from previous page – 
Panel A reports the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around (1) the major SOX legislative events identified by Zhang (2007), (2) four events related to 
the implementation of Section 404 rules and PCAOB related work, and (3) five events related to the SEC’s issuance of management guidance (MG) and the 
PCAOB’s AS5. The reported returns are the sum of the three-day (-1,1) returns for each identified event (see Appendix B). We calculate the abnormal returns 
relative to the returns of non-U.S.-traded foreign firms following the method of Zhang (2007). Panel A also reports the fraction of respondent firms that lobbied 
against the strict implementation of SOX-related rules identified by Hochberg et al. (2009) and mean changes in respondent firms’ information environment 
quality measured over the five years before (1997–2001) and after (2003–2007) the passage of SOX. Accruals quality (Accruals) is the ratio of pre- to post-SOX 
standard deviations of the residuals from Dechow and Dichev (2002). Liquidity is the post- minus pre-SOX Amihud (2002) liquidity decile ranking of the 
company. Beta is the post- minus pre-SOX beta from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Return variation is the post- minus pre-SOX log transformation of 1- 
R2 (Log(1-R2)-Log(R2)) from the same model. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Panel B reports Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the decile/centile rankings of these measures (except the lobbying indicator) and the responses to the survey questions reported in 
Table 2. Bold-faced values indicate significance at the 10% level.  
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Fig. 1.a – Total 404 cost as a percentage of the total assets, grouped by company size tercile and number of 
years 404(b) compliant. The sample includes all firm-year observations where the respondent firm is Section 404(b) 
compliant and has non-missing total compliance cost and size information. Each firm may appear up to three times 
(across the three reporting years) and firm-size rankings are defined separately for each firm-year using the firm 
market value of equity measured at the fiscal year end of the corresponding compliance year.  
 
Fig. 1.b – Non-404 audit fees as a percentage of the total assets, grouped by the company size and 404(b) 
compliance year. The sample includes all firm-year observations where the respondent firm is Section 404(b) 
compliant and has non-missing non-404(b) audit fee and size information. Each firm may appear up to three times 
(across the three reporting years) and firm-size rankings are defined separately for each firm-year using the firm 
market value of equity measured at the fiscal year end of the corresponding compliance year.   
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Appendix A. Variable construction.  
Variable  Definition 
 
Company complexity 
MVE The market value of equity from Audit Analytics measured at the fiscal year end and 
converted in the cross-section to a decile ranking. 
GeoDispersion The weighted-average of the log(distance) between each of the company’s regions of 
operations listed in its 10-K and its headquarters. The company regions are identified using 
a Perl program that matches 56 U.S. states and territories, 13 Canadian provinces, and 201 
sovereign countries recognized by the U.S. State Department to sections of the 10-K that 
comprises item 1 (Description of business), item 2 (description of properties), item 6 
(selected financial data), and item 8 (supplementary financial data). Distance is the number 
of miles from the company’s headquarter city to the midpoint of the referenced region using 
the spherical law of cosines: acos(sin(latitude1)*sin(latitude2)+ cos(latitude1)* 
cos(latitude2)* cos(longitude1-longitude2))* 3958.76. Each distance is weighted by the 
number of times the corresponding region is mentioned in the 10-K. The measure is 
converted in the cross-section to decile rankings. 
R&D Research and development expense reported by Compustat divided by the total assets and 
converted in the cross-section to a decile ranking. 
MultiSegment An indicator variable equal to one when the number of operating segments reported by 
Compustat’s Segments database is greater than one. 
 
Firm governance 
InstOwn The aggregate ownership reported by the 13F filers within the most recent fiscal quarter 
relative to the company’s fiscal year end and converted in the cross-section to centile 
rankings. The data are obtained from Thomson Financial. 
OutsideBlock An indicator variable equal to one if there is at least one 5% shareholder that is not an 
officer or director of the firm. Blockholders are identified from Schedule 13G and 13D 
filings made with the SEC. The central index key (CIK) number associated with the 
reporting party of each filing is cross-referenced with the SEC ownership forms 3, 4, and 5 
to ensure that the reporting party is not also an officer or director of the company. 
AffiliateBlock An indicator variable equal to one if there is a large inside shareholder satisfying any of the 
following: (1) an officer or director who owns at least 5% of the company; (2) a 
blockholder (defined above) who shares the same last name as another blockholder, 
director, or officer of the same company – indicative of family control; (3) the last name of 
an individual blockholder is also the company name. Blockholder and officer/director data 
are extracted from the SEC Schedule 13G and 13D filings and SEC forms 3, 4, and 5. A 
Perl script is used to extract and match the names from each filing. 
G index The governance index defined by Gompers et al. (2003) and converted in the cross-section 
to a decile ranking.  
 
 
 52 
 
 
 
Material weaknesses 
ICDremediate An indicator variable equal to one if during the most recently completed compliance year
the company did not disclose an internal control weakness under either Section 404(a) or
404(b) as reported by Audit Analytics. But, the company did disclose an internal control
weakness in a prior year. 
ICDcurrent An indicator variable equal to one if during the most recently completed compliance year
the company discloses at least one internal control weakness under either Section 404(a) or
404(b) as reported by Audit Analytics. 
Restatement An indicator variable equal to one if during the most recently completed compliance year
the company restated financials in an amended filing or 8-K disclosure as reported by Audit 
Analytics. 
 
Pre- to Post-SOX changes in information environment 
Accruals  The accruals quality is the standard deviation of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals
quality measure. The change in accruals quality is the ratio of the post-SOX period (2003–
2007) to the pre-SOX period (1997–2001) and converted to a centile ranking.  
Liquidity  The Amihud (2002) price impact of trading. The respondent firms are ranked by liquidity
deciles for the pre-SOX (1997–2001) and post-SOX (2003–2007) periods. Change in 
liquidity is the post- minus pre-SOX liquidity ranking where higher rankings denote higher 
liquidity.  
Beta The beta is the coefficient estimate on the market risk premium from a Carhart (1997) four-
factor model regression – including the momentum factor – where the market is the CRSP 
equal-weighted index. Change in the beta is the post-SOX (2003-2007) beta minus the pre-
SOX (1997-2001) beta and converted to a centile ranking. 
Return 
variation 
The firm-specific stock variation is measured as the log transformation of 1- R2 (Log(1-R2)-
Log(R2)) from the Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions estimated by using the monthly 
returns data over the pre- and post-SOX periods. Change in the return variation is the post-
SOX (2003–2007) minus the pre-SOX (1997–2001) return variation and converted to a 
centile ranking. 
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Appendix B. The mean cumulative abnormal returns around major SOX and Section 404 events. 
The table reports the mean buy-and-hold returns (BHRET) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
starting one trading day before and ending one trading day after the major SOX events (i.e., events 2, 14, 
16, and 17 in Zhang (2007)) and around the four events related to Section 404 proposal and passage. 
Abnormal returns are calculated applying model (1a) from Zhang (2007): 
Reti,t = a0 + a1CAN_Rett + a2EU_Rett + a3EU_Rett+1+ a4AS_Rett + a5AS_Rett+1+ et 
where Reti,t is the raw return of respondent firm i on date t, U.S. time. The CAN_Rett, EU_Rett, and 
AS_Rett denote the returns from Canadian, European, and Asian (including Australia and New Zealand) 
listed firms on date t local time, obtained from Datastream. First, we estimate the model for each 
respondent firm using the 2001 daily return data for the SOX event analysis and the 2005 daily return data 
for the Section 404 (MG and AS5) event analysis. Then, we compute the cumulative abnormal return as 
the sum of the prediction errors over the relevant event window. The ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  N 
Mean 
BHRET 
Mean 
CAR 
2/2/02 
Treasury calls for changes in rules governing
corporations  -0.025***  0.003 
7/8/02 Senate debates Sarbanes’ bill  -0.020*** -0.002 
7/18-7/25/02 Senate and House pass SOX  -0.056*** -0.015 
 Zhang events CAR 1,885 -0.100***     -0.013*** 
    
10/16/02 SEC proposes Section 404  0.060*** 0.001 
5/27/03 
SEC implements Internal Control Provisions of SOX
Act  0.024*** 0.005 
7/29/03 PCAOB reveals work on Section 404  0.005*** 0.010 
10/7/03 PCAOB proposes rules related to Section 404  0.011*** 0.004 
 Section 404 CAR 1,896   0.099***     0.019*** 
    
5/17/06 First SEC mention of Management Guidance and AS5     -0.019*** 0.000 
12/13/06 SEC votes to propose Management Guidance  0.002 0.000 
5/23/07 SEC approves Management Guidance     -0.010     -0.002 
6/20/07 SEC publishes Management Guidance     -0.003      0.000 
7/25/07 SEC approves AS5  -0.046**   -0.013*** 
 MGAS5 CAR 2,245  -0.075***  -0.014*** 
 
 
